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I. Introduction
THE RULES OF evidence recognize that occasionally jurors need
expert help in resolving important factual issues. The California Evi-
dence Code ("Code") and the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rules")
have responded by replacing restrictive common law rules with a gen-
erous approach that generally allows experts to present to jurors the
same kind of information experts use and rely upon in their respec-
tive fields. But opening the door to expert testimony has raised a num-
ber of concerns. Chief among these is the fear that testimony by
experts with impressive credentials will overwhelm the jurors. The
rules betray a concern that, rather than resolving factual controversies
by a dispassionate consideration of the evidence, jurors might overes-
timate the value of expert testimony and give undue weight to evi-
dence of dubious worth.
* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford University. This paper was prepared
in response to a request by the California Law Revision Commission for an assessment of
whether the California Evidence Code should be replaced by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Part I, Expert Testimony and the Opinion Rule, is the second paper in the
series and was submitted to the Commission on July 19, 2002. The California and federal
provisions compared were in effect as of December 2001.
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The framers of modern evidence codes have sought to diminish
the risk ofjuror attributional error by requiring trial judges, upon ob-
jection, to withhold unreliable expert testimony from the jurors. En-
trusting judges with this gatekeeping task raises two questions. One is
whether the judge should play a limited or expansive role in screening
the evidence. The other concerns the grounds for excluding unrelia-
ble expert testimony.
Whether a judge should play a limited or expansive role in
screening the evidence depends on one's view of the competency of
jurors to assess expert testimony. Those with confidence in the ability
of jurors to assess the testimony would favor a sufficiency standard. If
the question, for example, is whether the expert used inappropriate
matter in reaching an opinion, the judge would allow the jurors to
hear the opinion if the proponent made a prima facie case to the
judge that the expert used appropriate data. The opponent would still
be entitled to adduce contrary evidence through its own experts in its
case-in-chief or rebuttal. But that evidence would not result in the re-
consideration of the admissibility decision. Instead, the jurors would
be allowed to assess the weight they should give to the expert's opin-
ion based on the conflicting evidence presented by the parties. In the
end the jurors would be the final arbiters of the value and validity of
the expert testimony.
Those who distrust the ability ofjurors to assess expert testimony
would favor giving judges a greater role in screening the evidence.
The judge should be empowered to withhold expert opinion from the
jurors unless the judge is convinced that the opinion is valid. In fact,
both the Code and the Rules adopt this model. But neither the lan-
guage of their respective rules nor the opinions construing those rules
adequately specify the grounds for objecting to expert testimony or
the burden the proponent must discharge, although recent amend-
ments to the Rules have remedied some of these defects in federal
trials.I
The law's discomfort with expert testimony can be measured by
comparing the law's response to hearsay. Hearsay is frequently cited as
the classic example of unreliable evidence. Unless hearsay falls into an
exception, it is excluded because the opposing party is deprived of the
opportunity to test its trustworthiness whenever the source of the testi-
mony is not produced for examination under oath in front of the fact
1. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
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finder. 2 Where the opponent does have that opportunity, concern
about the use of hearsay diminishes and in some cases disappears alto-
gether.3 In contrast, the opportunity to cross examine experts on their
credentials as well as on the data, principles, and methods they use in
arriving at their opinions does not automatically result in the admis-
sion of their testimony. Unless the judge is convinced by all the evi-
dence, including the opposing party's, that the expert opinion is
reliable, the judge must (or should) withhold the evidence from the
jurors.
The grounds for excluding expert testimony can best be deter-
mined by focusing on the opposing party's objections. Opponents
should be able to choose from an array of objections. These include
objecting to the need for the expert testimony as well as challenging
the qualifications of the witness to provide the evidence. In addition,
the opponents should be able to object to a particular opinion on the
ground that it is based on inappropriate matter as determined by ex-
perts in the field. They should also have an opportunity to contest the
validity of the principles and the propriety of the methods employed
by the witness in reaching the expert opinion. The Code and the
Rules are not in agreement on the availability of these grounds.
This article compares the California and federal approaches to
the admissibility of expert testimony. Part II discusses the opinion
rule, a fundamental limitation that discourages the use of opinions by
witnesses. Part III introduces an exception for certain lay opinions.
Part IV traces the evolution of the exception for expert opinions and
shows how the Code and the Rules use similar approaches to withhold
unreliable evidence from jurors. Part V explores important differ-
ences in the role California and federal judges play in screening some
types of expert testimony. Part VI suggests changes to the Code that
2. In California, a judge is empowered to withhold hearsay from the jurors unless
the proponent convinces the judge by a preponderance of the evidence of circumstances
justifying the exception. Once that showing has been made, the judge may allow the jurors
to hear the hearsay declaration. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 (West 1995) (relating to the
establishment of foundational facts). For a detailed explanation of the role of the judge in
ruling on hearsay objections, see MIGUEL A. M9NDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND
THE FEDERAL RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH §§ 17.03-.04 (2d ed. 1999).
3. Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses about their prior statements has resulted in exempting their out of court state-
ments from the definition of hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1). Subject to certain limita-
tions, their out of court statements can be offered for the truth even if the opponent
declines the opportunity to cross examine them. See id. The Code achieves the same out-
come by creating hearsay exceptions for these statements. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 1235-1236, 1238 (West 1995).
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would specify more fully the grounds for objecting to expert testimony
and clarify the burden the proponent should discharge. Parts VII and
VIII round out the article by comparing the California and federal
rules governing the cross-examination of experts and the appoint-
ment of experts by judges.
II. The Opinion Rule
The American system of proof discourages the giving of opin-
ions.4 It proceeds on the assumption that the fact finder can resolve
factual disputes on the basis of the information presented by the par-
ties. If the issue is whether the defendant was negligent, then the ju-
rors can decide that question on the basis of the evidence that was
received. The jurors do not need a witness to tell them whether in the
witness's opinion the defendant was negligent.5
Observations, however, are often expressed in the form of opin-
ions or conclusions. When we say that it is raining or it is cold, these
observations are really deductions or conclusions based on our experi-
ence with weather conditions. Though the law of evidence disfavors
opinions, it recognizes that forcing witnesses to describe their observa-
tions without using conclusions would make for awkward, time-con-
suming testimony. Both the Code and the Rules allow lay witnesses to
testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is rationally based on
the perception of the witness and is helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness's testimony.6
At times, however, the fact finder, whether judge or juror, is inca-
pable of resolving a factual issue because the knowledge needed is
beyond the fact finder's competence. An issue in a personal injury
case, for example, may be whether the plaintiffs back injury is perma-
nent. Jurors hearing the plaintiff's description of her injuries and
even her doctor's diagnosis of the injuries will probably be unable to
decide this issue without expert help. Accordingly, the law of evidence
will permit an expert to tell the jurors whether in the expert's opinion
the plaintiff's injuries are permanent. 7 Of course, the expert will not
be allowed to provide the jurors with the opinion or prognosis unless
4. See Holland v. Zollner, 36 P. 930, 931 (Cal. 1894), affd, 37 P. 231 (Cal. 1894).
5. See Westbrooks v. State, 219 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
expert opinion could not be received on whether safety measures eliminated dangerous
conditions at a collapsed bridge because jurors could determine that issue from the evi-
dence without expert help).
6. See FED. R. EviD. 701; CAL. EVID. COnE § 800 (West 1995).
7. See FED. R. EviD. 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 1995).
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he or she is qualified to do so.8 The jurors, however, do not need to
be "wholly ignorant"9 of the subject to which the expert opinion is
directed. Expert opinion should be excluded only when it would add
nothing to the jurors' common fund of knowledge.' 0
To ensure the reliability of the expert opinion, in California the
proponent of the testimony must satisfy the judge that, in reaching
the opinion, the expert relied on matter of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field.1 Sometimes the proponent must clear
an additional hurdle. If the expert's testimony is based on a novel
scientific principle, the proponent may also have to demonstrate that
the principle has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant sci-
entific community. 12
The Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert opinion are re-
markably similar to the California Evidence Code provisions. But as
will be shown, as a result principally ofjudicial interpretation, the role
of the federal trial judge today differs markedly from that of the Cali-
fornia trial judge in determining the admissibility of some kinds of
expert testimony.
III. Lay Opinion
Despite the general proscription against opinions, lay witnesses
are allowed to give a variety of opinions. For over a century, California
lay witnesses have been permitted to estimate quantity, value, weight,
measure, time, distance, and velocity; to describe such emotions as
anger, fear, excitement, love, hatred, sorrow, and joy; to describe char-
acter traits, such as truthfulness and mendacity; to describe aspects of
appearance, such as age, manner of walking, and type of hair; to re-
late whether others appeared to be sick, well, intoxicated, or even
irrational.13
Some of these deductions resemble observations that for conve-
nience's sake are expressed in the form of a shorthand opinion or
conclusion, for example, describing others as angry, happy, or sad.
Others imply greater deliberation in reaching the characterization,
for instance, describing someone as irrational. The witness who pro-
vides this opinion can probably describe a number of specific acts
8. See FED. R. EVID. 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (b).
9. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1984).
10. See id.
11. See CAL. EvI D. CODE § 801(b).
12. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
13. See Holland v. Zollner, 36 P. 930, 931-32 (Cal. 1894), affd, 37 P. 231 (Cal. 1894).
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which prompted the witness to characterize the conduct as irra-
tional. 14 Yet, both characterizations-angry and irrational-are of-
fered by the California Law Revision Commission as examples of
permissible lay opinions. 15 These examples underscore the modern
approach to lay opinions: The question is not whether the witness can
describe the observations underlying an opinion but whether the
opinion is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testi-
mony.16 If in the exercise of his discretion a California or federal
judge finds that the opinion is helpful, thejudge will permit thejurors
to hear the opinion if it is rationally based on the witness's
perception. 17
Federal Rule 701 was amended in 200018 to exclude lay opinions
which are based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge and which would be governed by Rule 702's limitations if
presented as expert testimony rather than as lay opinion. The amend-
ment is designed
to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in
Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffer-
ing an expert in lay witness clothing. Under the amendment, a wit-
ness's testimony must be scrutinized under the rules regulating
expert opinion to the extent that the witness is providing testimony
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.19
The Code does not contain this limitation.2 1 Though the risk that
prompted the amendment to the Rule exists in California, the risk
apparently is small. Appellate opinions do not disclose an abuse of the
California provision.
IV. Expert Opinion: Convergence
When first adopted in 1975, the federal approach to the admissi-
bility of expert opinion was remarkably similar to that of the Califor-
nia Evidence Code. To appreciate the changes introduced by the
Code and the Rules, it is important to focus first on why the common
law allowed expert testimony in the first place.
14. See, e.g., id. (describing specific conduct such as drinking five glasses of milk at
once, throwing food, etc.).
15. See 6 CALIFORNIA LAw REVISION COMMISSION, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
STUDIES 931-35 (1964).
16. See id. at 933.
17. See FED. R. EvID. 701; CAL. EVID. CODE § 800 (West 1995).
18. See FED. R. EvID. 701.
19. Id. advisory committee's note.
20. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 800.
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The common law recognized that the triers of fact, whether
judges or jurors, were sometimes incapable of drawing a necessary in-
ference from the evidence. 21 If the issue, for example, was whether
the plaintiffs injury was permanent, the fact finder might not have
the training or experience needed to decide that issue from the testi-
mony of percipient witnesses, such as the plaintiffs account of the
effects of the injury.
One way to remedy this deficiency was to have a qualified medical
expert present in the courtroom during the examination of the plain-
tiff and other witnesses called to describe the plaintiffs injuries. The
expert would then be called to draw the needed inference from the
evidence in the form of an opinion. Convenience gave way to the use
of the hypothetical question. No longer was it necessary to have the
expert sit in court. Instead, the calling party could supply the critical
parts of the percipient witnesses' testimony to the expert in a question
in which the calling party asked the expert to assume the existence of
the facts supplied by the percipient witnesses. 22
First the Code and then the Rules introduced a radical change to
the use of expert opinion by allowing an expert to offer an opinion
that was not necessarily based on the evidence introduced at the
trial.23 Moreover, both permitted the use of the expert's opinion even
if it was based on matter that was inadmissible. 24 What is important
under the Code and the Rules is that the data used by the expert be of
the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Permitting
experts to base opinions on matter reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field conformed evidentiary practice with the customs and prac-
tices of experts themselves. Thus, if sound medical practices allow doc-
tors to reach important health decisions on information provided by
patients and specialists, then those decisions should be sufficiently re-
liable for use in court even if the information provided by patients
and specialists is not admissible.
The use of inadmissible information to support an expert opin-
ion introduced a new danger: the risk that fact finders might use the
inadmissible matter for an improper purpose. It might be sound med-
ical practice for a doctor to use a radiologist's report in determining
whether the plaintiffs injury is permanent. But over a hearsay objec-
tion, it would be improper for the jurors to consider the radiologist's
21. See MtNDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.01, at 411.
22. See MtNDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.03, at 413.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 703; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995).
24. See FED. R. EVWD. 703; CAL. EvIo. CODE § 801(b) law revision commission's cmt.
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report for the truth of the matter asserted unless the report has been
received in evidence.25 It is one matter for the doctor on direct exami-
nation to tell the jurors that she took the radiologist's report into ac-
count in reaching her prognosis. It is quite another for the doctor to
disclose the radiologist's finding to the jurors.
In California, the opposing party may object on hearsay (and
other) grounds to the doctor's disclosure of the radiologist's find-
ing.26 If the judge sustains the hearsay objection but concludes that
the probative value of disclosing the finding is not substantially out-
weighed by its prejudicial effects, the judge may allow the jury to hear
the evidence subject to a limiting instruction charging them not to
consider the finding for the truth of the matter stated. 27 Because of
doubts about whether jurors can abide by this instruction, a 2000
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 prohibits the disclosure
of inadmissible facts or data to the jurors unless the judge determines
that their probative value in assisting the jurors to evaluate the ex-
pert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effects. 28
The Rules offer the opposing party greater protection than does
the Code. Under the Rules' special balancing provision, the judge may
not allow the proponent to disclose the inadmissible matter unless its
evaluative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects. Under
the California approach, the traditional balancing rule requires the
judge to allow disclosure of the inadmissible matter unless its prejudi-
cial effect substantially outweighs its evaluative value.2 9 Because of the
significant risk that jurors might not abide by the limiting instruction,
California should consider adopting the Rules' special balancing test.
Other federal provisions governing the use of expert opinion vir-
tually mirror the provisions found in the Code. Both recognize that
for expert opinion to be received the fact finders do not have to be
wholly ignorant of the subject to which the expert testimony is di-
rected.30 It is enough if the expert opinion assists the fact finders in
understanding evidence 31 or determining an issue that is beyond their
25. See MINDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.03, at 415.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 703. Even where the federal judge makes this finding, the oppos-
ing party is still entitled to the limiting instruction. See id. advisory committee's note (citing
FED. R. Evio. 105).
29. Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 with CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
30. See FED. R. Evil. 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (a) (West 1995).
31. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a).
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common experience. 32 Both provide that an expert may be qualified
on the basis of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 33
including the expert's own testimony.34 Both allow the use of opinions
even if they embrace ultimate issues, so long as the opinions are other-
wise admissible. 35 And both permit experts to give their opinions with-
out first disclosing the basis of their opinions, unless the judge
requires otherwise. 36
California has some special provisions. One addresses the admis-
sibility of expert opinions based on other opinions. The provision
makes clear that an expert opinion can be based in whole or in part
on opinions by others,37 even if the other persons are unavailable for
examination. 38 But if those persons are available, the adverse party
may call and examine them concerning their opinions as if under
cross-examination.3 9 While not specifically addressed in the Rules,
nothing in them prohibits the adverse party from calling and examin-
ing these witnesses or prohibits the use of opinions based on opinions
by individuals who are unavailable for examination. Under the Code
and probably under the Rules, the admissibility of expert testimony
based on opinions by others depends initially on whether those opin-
ions are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in
reaching their conclusions. 40
California has a number of provisions governing opinion evi-
dence regarding the value of real property or real and personal prop-
erty taken as a unit.4 1 These provisions are no longer limited to
eminent domain and inverse condemnation proceedings but include
any action or proceeding in which the value of the property is to be
determined, including actions or proceedings involving inheritance
32. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
33. See id.; CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a) (West 1995).
34. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(b). An expert's testimony as to her own qualifications
would likewise be admissible in federal court under the Rules' relevance provisions. See
FED. R. EVID. 401-402.
35. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West 1995).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 705; CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 1995). As a matter of effective
advocacy, however, lawyers will ask experts to disclose the basis of their opinions on direct
examination.
37. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 804(a) (West 1995).
38. See id. § 804(d).
39. See id. § 804(a). See section 804(b) for exceptions to the cross-examination right.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 703; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995). Under the Code,
opinions do not need to be based on matter reasonably relied on by experts in the field if
an expert "is precluded by law from offering such matter as a basis for his opinion." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 801 (b).
41. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 810 senate legislative committee's cmt. (West 1995).
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taxation, breach of sales contracts, gift taxation, and mortgage defi-
ciencies.42 Presumably these provisions are designed to respond to
California property evaluation problems, and they should be retained.
California also has special provisions on the use of lay and expert
opinion on the question of sanity.43 They too should be retained.
Of particular importance in criminal cases, California has a provi-
sion authorizing the use of expert testimony to prove battered wo-
men's syndrome, including its use to explain why a woman suffering
from the syndrome perceived a need to kill in self-defense. 44 The pro-
vision is designed to end controversy regarding the use of battered
women's syndrome evidence and should be retained.
The Rules prohibit an expert from giving an opinion on whether
the accused did or did not have the mental state constituting an ele-
ment of the offense charged or a defense to that charge.45 This provi-
sion was added by Congress in 1984.46 Earlier that year, the California
Legislature added a similar provision to the Penal Code prohibiting
an expert from testifying about whether an accused's mental illness,
disorder, or defect precluded the accused from forming the mental
state needed to prove the offense charged. 47 Although the California
provision is narrower, in both jurisdictions only the trier of fact is al-
lowed to deduce whether the accused entertained the requisite
mental state.48 Since California subject matter jurisdiction is much
broader than federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is not surprising to
find more detailed evidence provisions under the Code than under
the Rules.
V. Expert Opinion: Divergence
The Code and the Rules, as interpreted, differ on the role the
judge should play in excluding some forms of unreliable expert testi-
mony. Although the Code and the Rules began with similar provi-
sions, judicial construction of the California and federal provisions
has led to a divergence in the judge's role.
42. See id. senate legislative committee's cmt.
43. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 870 (West 1995).
44. See CAL. EvIo. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 2002).
45. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
46. See Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title IV, § 406, 98 Stat. 1837.
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1999).
48. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
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A. California: The General Rule
Expert opinion will not help fact finders understand evidence or
resolve issues beyond their competence unless the expert is qualified
to provide them with the help they need. Whether an expert is quali-
fied to provide the needed help is determined under section 405 of
the California Evidence Code.49 This provision is designed to with-
hold unreliable evidence from the jurors.50 Combined with other pro-
visions, it requires the party calling the expert to persuade the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert is qualified to
render the needed assistance. 5 1
Even the opinion of a qualified expert will not help the fact find-
ers unless it is validly drawn from appropriate data. The Code at-
tempts to exclude unreliable opinions by limiting experts to opinions
based on matter "that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon"
by experts in the field.5 2 As the California Law Revision Commission
explains, "In large measure, this [provision] assures the reliability and
trustworthiness of the information used by experts in forming their
opinions."53 Over objection, the calling party must persuade the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert's opinion is predi-
cated on such matter.5 4 In Board of Trustees v. Porini,55 for example,
expert testimony that a teacher was mentally ill was excluded because
the expert improperly relied on opinions by lay persons contained in
a dossier on the teacher. 56
Moreover, determining whether required protocols or methodol-
ogies have been followed also should be governed by section 405. The
failure to follow correct procedures can result in invalid conclusions
even if the expert is qualified to draw the conclusion and used appro-
priate data. 57 Accordingly, over objection, the calling party should
persuade the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the ex-
pert followed the required protocols and methodologies in reaching
49. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary's cmt. (West 1995).
50. See id.
51. See MtNDEZ, supra note 2, § 17.04, at 448.
52. CAL. EVr. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995). The "matter" upon which an expert opin-
ion may be based includes but is not limited to the expert's special knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, and education. See id.
53. Id. law revision commission's cmt.
54. See M9NDEZ, supra note 2, §§ 17.03-04, at 444, 448; see also CAL. Evo. CODE § 405
assembly committee on judiciary's cmt. (West 1995) ("Section 405 deals with evidentiary
rules designed to withhold evidence from the jury because it is too unreliable.
55. 70 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Ct. App. 1968).
56. See id. at 79-80.
57. See People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 427 (Ct. App. 1991).
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the opinion. 58 Smith v. ACandS, Inc.5 9 is an example of a court's review
of the procedures used. Expert testimony regarding the quantity of
asbestos at a job site was held inadmissible because the calling party
failed to convince the judge that the expert employed the correct
method for measuring asbestos levels.6"
The inadmissibility of expert opinions based on improper matter
is reinforced in California by another rule. On its own motion or
upon objection, a court is required to "exclude testimony in the form
of an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on matter
that is not a proper basis for such an opinion."'6 1
B. California: A Special Rule
When the expert opinion is based on novel scientific principles
or techniques, the California courts use the Kelly test to determine the
admissibility of the opinion. Adopting the approach taken in Frye v.
United States,62 the California Supreme Court held in People v. Kelly63
that the proponent must persuade the judge that the novel scientific
principle or technique has been "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs." 64 General acceptance in the field, notjust reasonable reliance
by experts as defined in the Code, 65 is the test.36
Critics of the Kelly approach emphasize the difficulties of distin-
guishing expert testimony based on novel scientific principles from
other expert testimony, of deciding in which field the principle be-
longs, and of determining whether it has been generally accepted by
the members of that field. 67 The California Supreme Court has none-
theless defended the use of the general acceptance test. In the court's
58. See People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 545 (Cal. 1998).
59. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994).
60. See id. at 465-66 (holding that the expert's use of photographs instead of filtering
the air through a membrane and then using an electron microscope to magnify the mem-
brane to count the retained asbestos fibers was an incorrect method).
61. CAL. EVID. CODE § 803 (West 1995).
62. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
63. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
64. Id. at 1244 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014) (emphasis omitted).
65. See CAL. Evin. CODE § 801. As noted, the Code attempts to exclude unreliable
expert opinions by limiting experts to opinions reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field. See supra text accompanying note 52.
66. See Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244.
67. See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 490 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). An additional criticism of the Kelly-Frye test is that in some
fields, especially the forensic sciences, the experts in the field all depend for their living on
the viability of their expertise. According to Jennifer Mnookin:
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view, the test promotes a degree of uniformity with respect to the ad-
missibility of evidence based on scientific principles: "Individual
judges whose particular conclusions may differ regarding the reliabil-
ity of particular scientific evidence, may discover substantial agree-
ment and consensus in the scientific community." 6 Of greater
importance, the test is designed "to interpose a substantial obstacle to
the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific
principles." 69 In the court's view, caution is called for because of the
risk that jurors might give unwarranted weight to "scientific evidence
when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials. ' 70 Finally,
the court favors applying stringent standards to the use of scientific
evidence based upon a new scientific technique because:
once a trial court has admitted evidence based upon a new scien-
tiic technique, and that decision is affirmed on appeal by a pub-
lished appellate decision, the precedent so established may control
subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is presented reflecting
a change in the attitude of the scientific community.
7 1
We would hardly expect polygraph examiners to be the most objective or critical
observers of the polygraph, or those who practice hair identification to argue that
the science was insufficiently reliable. When there is challenge to the fundamen-
tal reliability of a technique through which the practitioners make their' living,
there is good reason to be especially dubious about "general acceptance" as a
proxy for reliability.
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13,
63 (2001).
68. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. It is not altogether clear why an appellate opinion upholding the use of partic-
ular scientific principle or technique should be given an estoppel effect. Traditional princi-
ples of resjudicata and collateral estoppel simply do not apply because the parties to the
appellate case approving the use of the evidence at the trial level are not the parties in the
subsequent suit in which the admissibility of the evidence is contested. The doctrine of
stare decisis may likewise be unavailable. It provides that a point of law determined by an
appellate court should be followed by the lower courts within the jurisdiction. See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 939 (Cal. 1962). Thus, the California
Supreme Court's determination in Kelly that evidence based on novel scientific principles
or techniques must pass the general acceptance test is binding on the lower courts. But an
appellate determination that a particular principle or technique passes the test may be no
more than an appellate assessment that the trial judge's ruling admitting the evidence over
objection was not incorrect. In essence, the appellate court is merely rejecting the appeal-
ing party's claim that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence presented by the oppos-
ing parties, including the credibility of the witnesses, was in error.
Irrespective of whether conventional doctrine supports the court's assertion in Kelly,
lower courts must now resolve which aspects of a favorable Kelly appellate determination
are entitled to an estoppel effect. The consensus appears to be that only the first determi-
nation-that a particular principle or technique has been generally accepted by the perti-
nent scientific community-is entitled to this effect. See People v. Morganti, 50 Cal. Rptr.
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The court's defense notwithstanding, the use of the Kelly test does
pose some problems. As the critics maintain, at times it calls for the
difficult task of distinguishing novel scientific evidence from other ex-
pert testimony. In People v. Stoll,7 2 for example, the California Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine whether the Code's
reasonable reliance test or Kelly applied to a clinical psychologist's
opinion that a defendant charged with committing lewd and lascivi-
ous acts upon children displayed no signs of deviance or abnormal-
ity.73 In holding that Kelly did not apply, the court discerned two
"themes" that should guide judges and lawyers in determining which
test applies.7 4
First, the court emphasized that Kelly is limited "to that ... class of
expert testimony which is based, in whole or in part, on a technique,
process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the
law."' 75 Until the courts are reasonably certain that the pertinent scien-
tific community no longer views such techniques as "experimental or
of dubious validity," the courts should forego the use of the evi-
dence. 76 Upon objection, then, the proponent must persuade the
judge that the principle or technique either is not new to science or
law or, if it is, that it satisfies the Kelly test.
Second, the court underscored that Kelly should be applied to
expert evidence that carries a "misleading aura of scientific infallibil-
ity." 77 According to the court, the concern is with "the unproven tech-
nique or procedure" which threatens to mislead jurors because they
appear "in both name and description to provide some definitive
truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the
jury. The most obvious examples are machines or procedures which
2d 837, 846 (Ct. App. 1996) and cases cited therein. Previous published decisions regard-
ing whether correct procedures were used and whether the expert called to relate the
findings was qualified to give them are not entitled to an estoppel effect. See id. at 848-49
and cases cited therein. Morganti has been cited with approval by the California Supreme
Court. See People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 545 (Cal. 1998).
72. 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
73. See id. at 703-04.
74. See id. at 710.
75. Id. See also People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 332 (Cal. 1994):
In determining whether a scientific technique is "new" for Kelly purposes,
long-standing use by police officers seems less significant a factor than repeated
use, study, testing and confirmation by scientists or trained technicians. ...
... To hold that a scientific technique could become immune from Kelly
scrutiny merely by reason of long-standing and persistent use by law enforcement
outside the laboratory or the courtroom, seems unjustified.
76. Stoll, 783 P.2d at 710.
77. Id. at 711.
[Vol. 37
analyze physical data."78 Other examples cited by the court include
expert opinions based on polygraphs, truth serum, Nalline tests,
human bite marks, microscopic identification of gunshot residue par-
ticles, electrophoretic testing of body fluid and blood stains, the
hemostick method of presumptive testing for the presence of blood,79
and penile plethysmographs 80
Despite the court's guidelines, it is still difficult at times to deter-
mine whether Kelly should apply to particular expert opinions. Before
Stoll, for example, reasonable people could disagree on whether Kelly
applied to an opinion that a person charged with committing lewd
and lascivious acts did not exhibit signs of abnormality or deviance.
Without question, the uncertainty surrounding Kelly's application is a
drawback, as lawyers and judges will not always find guidance in the
cases distinguishing circumstances in which Kelly applies from those in
which only the Code's reasonable reliance test suffices. 8'
Other aspects of Kelly have also proved troublesome. One relates
to the burden the calling party must discharge when the opponent
successfully interposes a Kelly objection. Though the application of
the Code's provisions seems straightforward, the California courts
have struggled to define the burden.
As has been noted, in all cases in which the admissibility of expert
opinion is contested, the proponent must convince the judge that the
expert testimony would be helpful to the jury and that the expert is
qualified to give them that help. If Kelly applies, the proponent must
also persuade the judge that the scientific principles or techniques
underlying the expert testimony meet the general acceptance test.
8 2
Moreover, if the expert testimony is predicated on the application of
specific protocols or methodologies, the proponent must satisfy the
judge that the correct procedures were followed. 83
78. Id. at 710.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 713 n.21.
81. For a collection and discussion of these cases, see M9NDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.04,
at 421-24.
82. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
83. See id. The California Supreme Court has characterized the Kelly test as consisting
of three prongs. The first is whether the principle or technique underlying the expert
opinion has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community; the second is
whether the expert is qualified to testify about the principle's or technique's general ac-
ceptance by the pertinent scientific community; the third is whether the expert opinion
offered was the result of following correct scientific procedures. See People v. Venegas, 954
P.2d 525, 545 (Cal. 1998).
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Since Kelly is designed to withhold expert testimony that is too
unreliable to be evaluated properly, the question whether the underly-
ing scientific principle or technique has been generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community should be governed by section 405
of the California Evidence Code.84 Under section 405, the judge
should exclude the expert testimony unless the proponent convinces
the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the principle or
technique in question meets the Kelly standards of acceptance.85 If af-
ter the hearing it is unclear to the judge whether the required scien-
tific consensus has developed, the judge should exclude the expert
evidence. 86
Moreover, the question whether specific protocols or methodolo-
gies have been followed also should be governed by section 405.87 The
failure to follow correct procedures in applying the novel principle or
technique involved could give rise to opinions that are as unreliable as
opinions based on principles and techniques rejected by the relevant
scientific community. Accordingly, the failure to follow the appropri-
ate procedures should result in the exclusion of the expert opinion
even if the proponent has demonstrated general acceptance by the
pertinent scientific community of the scientific principles or tech-
niques underlying the opinion.88
Confusion surrounding this prong of the Kelly test stems from the
California courts' failure to distinguish between evidence attacking
the expert opinion once it has been admitted and evidence offered to
prevent the admission of the expert opinion. Sometimes evidence is
offered attacking the methods of gathering, preserving, or testing the
data used to formulate the expert opinion not at the hearing to deter-
mine compliance with the Kelly test, but after the court has held that
the Kelly standards have been satisfied.8 9 Obviously, in such a situation
whether or not the appropriate protocols or methodologies have been
84. See CAL. Evil). COD- § 405 and assembly committee on judiciary's cmt. (West
1995); see also People v. Ashmus, 820 P.2d 214, 235 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841
(1992) (imposing the standards of section 405 without citing the section).
85. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 115, 405 (West 1995); see also People v. Brown, 726 P.2d
516, 525 (Cal. 1985).
86. See Brown, 726 P.2d at 527.
87. Accord People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 427 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting the impor-
tance of correct procedures although not citing to section 405).
88. See Venegas, 954 P.2d at 545. An exception should be made in the rare case where
the credible evidence shows that the failure to follow correct procedures is trivial and does
not materially affect the opinion.
89. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246, 252 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
testimony regarding the credibility of DNA evidence did not implicate the Kelly rule).
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followed goes to the weight of the evidence and should be considered
by the trier of fact.90 But where the attacking evidence has been of-
fered at the hearing to determine whether the Kelly standards have
been met, then the court cannot escape its duty to take the evidence
into account in making its Kelly ruling.91 Such a duty is consistent with
section 801 (b) of the California Evidence Code. This provision re-
quires judges to exclude expert opinion unless based on matter "that
is of the type that reasonably may be relied upon" by experts in the
field. 92 Whether or not a Kelly issue is involved, this command calls for
the exclusion of expert opinion whenever based on matter that is in-
appropriate because of the failure to abide by the protocols or meth-
odologies experts in the field would observe.
In light of a radically different interpretation given to admissibil-
ity of expert opinion under the Rules, it is important to note that Kelly
does not require the judge to determine whether the novel scientific
principles underlying the expert testimony are "reliable as a matter of
scientific fact."93 Rather, Kelly merely requires the judge to determine
"from the professional literature and expert testimony whether.., the
new scientific technique is accepted as reliable in the relevant scien-
tific community [or] whether scientists significant either in number or
expertise publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable."94 Kelly,
moreover,
does not demand the impossible-proof of an absolute unanimity
of views in the scientific community before a new technique will be
deemed reliable; any such unanimity would be highly unusual....
Rather, the test is met if use of the technique is supported by a
clear majority of the members of that community. 95
"General acceptance under Kelly means a consensus drawn from a typ-
ical cross-section of the relevant, qualified scientific community."96
Although the California appellate courts have treated Kelly as in-
dependent of the Evidence Code, such a view is not necessary. Admit-
90. Presumably, this is what the California Supreme Court had in mind when it de-
clared, "Careless testing affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, and
must be attacked on cross-examination or by other expert testimony." People v. Farmer,
765 P.2d 940, 956 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989).
91. See Venegas, 954 P.2d at 545.
92. CAL. EVIo. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995).
93. People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 421 (Ct. App. 1991). In federal courts, how-
ever, Daubert imposes this role on the judge. See infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
94. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421 (quoting in part People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516, 526
(1985)) (alteration in original).
95. People v. Guerra, 690 P.2d 635, 656 (Cal. 1984).
96. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 337 (Cal. 1994).
Winter 2003]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tedly, Kelly is based on Frye v. United States,97 a case that preceded the
adoption of the Code by over sixty years. And, indeed, until the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.98 superseded Frye, it was customary for the Califor-
nia courts to refer to the general acceptance test as the Kelly-Frye rule.
Nonetheless, the Code's provisions governing expert testimony sup-
port the use of Kelly. Over objection, expert opinion is inadmissible in
California unless it is based on matter that is of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in the field. 99 Clearly, expert opinion based on
novel scientific or techniques rejected by the pertinent scientific com-
munity fails that test. Kelly thus can be viewed as a specialized applica-
tion of the reasonable reliance test prescribed by the Code.
Neither Kelly nor the Code's reasonable reliance test is limited "to
techniques analyzing physical evidence."100 Both also embrace expert
opinion based on social science research. Given Kelly's aim of barring
the use of evidence based on techniques "which carry an [ ] unde-
served aura of certainty,"''" the test applies as well to "less tangible
new procedures,"1 12 such as "a new scientific process operating on
purely psychological evidence."' 0 3 An example is hypnotically re-
freshed testimony. In California, hypnotically refreshed testimony is
excluded because its use fails to satisfy the Kelly test.10 4
C. The Federal Approach
As originally enacted, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provided only
that facts or data used by an expert in reaching an opinion did not
have to be admissible if "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences."10 5 Although
the rule focused on dispensing with the admissibility of the underlying
data, the Advisory Committee's note suggests that the quoted lan-
guage might have had another purpose as well-to assure the reliabil-
97. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
98. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
99. See CAL. Evin. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995).
100. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989) (quoting in part People v. Shirley,
723 P. 2d 1354, 1374 (Cal. 1982)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1374-75).
104. See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1384. The court found that the use of hypnotically re-
freshed memory has not been generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific com-
munity. See id. at 1383.




ity of the opinion. In its note, the Advisory Committee cites the
California Law Revision Commission's comment to section 801 of the
California Evidence Code.'0 6 Section 801(b) limits expert opinions to
those based on matter "that is of a type that reasonably may be relied
upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which
his testimony relates . ... 107 In its comment, the Law Revision Com-
mission stresses that "[i]n large measure, this [limitation] assures the
reliability and trustworthiness of the information used by experts in
forming their opinions."' 08 If this was the construction the Advisory
Committee intended to give to Rule 703, then the rule provided fed-
eral judges with a basis for excluding unreliable expert testimony, in-
cluding opinions based on novel scientific principles or techniques
not generally accepted by the pertinent scientific community.
Whatever the intention of the Advisory Committee, in its 1993
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'0 9 decision, the United
States Supreme Court defined the role of federal judges in screening
expert testimony. The issue in Daubert was the proper standard for
admission of expert testimony.' 10 The petitioners claimed that the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence had displaced Frye.11' The
Court agreed. Noting sharp divisions among the circuits on the
proper standards for admitting expert testimony, the Court held that
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal trial judges must ensure
"that any and all scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant,
but reliable."' 12
The Court laid down four guidelines to help federal judges assess
the evidence's scientific validity: One is whether the evidence is based
106. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 law revi-
sion commission's cmt. (West 1995).
107. CAL. EvID. CODE § 801(b).
108. Id. law revision commission's cmt.
109. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
110. See id. at 585.
111. See id. at 587.
112. Id. at 589. At the time, Rule 702 provided that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID.
702 (1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 702 (West 2001)).
In discharging their gatekeeping function to ensure the relevance and reliability of
expert testimony, federal trial judges are accorded some protection. In reviewing the pro-
priety of a trial judge's ruling admitting or excluding scientific evidence, federal appellate
courts must apply the abuse of discretion standard. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 146 (1997).
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on theories or techniques that can be or have been tested. 13 In the
Court's view, the testing of hypotheses is what distinguishes science
from other fields. Another guideline is whether the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review and publication. 1 4 Though
publication is not "a sine qua non of admissibility" (some propositions
may be too new or of limited interest to be published), publication "in
a peer-reviewed journal" is a relevant consideration "in assessing the
scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which
an opinion is premised."' 5 A judge should also consider the known
or potential rate of error as well as the "existence and maintenance of
standards controlling [a] technique's operation.""'16 Finally, a judge
should consider whether the techniques or theories employed have
been generally accepted or rejected by the pertinent scientific com-
munity."I7 Though a finding that the proffered evidence is scientifi-
cally valid does not require that the techniques or theories supporting
it be generally accepted, widespread acceptance or rejection "can be
an important factor" in ruling the evidence admissible.' 18
The Court did not intend the Daubert guidelines to be exclusive.
Lower federal courts are free to consider other factors in determining
the reliability of expert testimony. 19 Examples include whether the
expert is proposing to testify on the basis of research conducted inde-
pendently of the litigation, whether the expert has adequately ac-
counted for obvious alternative explanations, whether the expert has
unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded
conclusion, and whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is
known to reach reliable results. 12(1 The latter factor is important be-
cause it is designed to foreclose testimony by "experts" who depend
for their living on the viability of the contested principle or technique
and then uncritically find that the principle or technique is generally
accepted.
113. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
114. See id. at 593-94.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 594.
117. See id.
118. Id. The Court underscored that in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence
thejudge should also apply other rules, such as Rule 703. See id. at 595 (citing FED. R. Evwr.
703). This rule provides that facts or data used by an expert need not be admissible in
order for the expert's opinion to be admitted, if the underlying matter is of a type reasona-
bly relied upon by experts in the field. See FED. R. EvIn. 703.
119. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
120. See generally FED. R. EVwn. 702 advisory committee's note (listing non-exclusive fac-
tors to be considered by the trial courts in assessing the reliability of scientific experts).
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Of significance to the federal bench and bar, Daubert is not lim-
ited to scientific evidence despite its emphasis on "scientific testi-
mony." In Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,12 1 the Supreme Court
held that the federal judiciary's obligation to ensure that all scientific
testimony is not only relevant but reliable extends to all "expert" testi-
mony. Emphasizing the inclusion in Rule 702 of such categories as
"technical" and "other specialized knowledge" in addition to "scien-
tific knowledge," the Court held that Daubert applied to the testimony
of a tire failure expert called by the plaintiffs to establish that their
injuries were caused by a defective tire manufactured by the
defendant. 22
In response to Daubert and Kumho, Federal Rule of Evidence 702
was amended in 2000.123 It now calls for the exclusion of expert opin-
ion based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge un-
less the judge finds that "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case."' 1 4 In the Advisory Commit-
tee's opinion, the "standards set forth in the amendment are broad
enough to require consideration of any or all of the specific Daubert
factors where appropriate."'' 25 In its note, the Advisory Committee
makes clear that under the amended rule the proponent must estab-
lish the admissibility requirements of expert testimony and other sci-
entific evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. 12 6
Has Daubert promoted or discouraged the use of expert testimony
in federal trials? Thus far, Daubert appears to have restrained the use
of expert testimony in federal civil cases. According to Professor
George Fisher:
A Rand Institute report released early in 2002 concludes that for
several years after Daubert, challenges to expert evidence in federal
civil actions prevailed more often than before. Focusing on cases
from the Third Circuit, the authors found that among those cases
in which expert evidence was challenged, "the exclusion rate ...
for evidence based on physical science in a product liability case
jumped from 53 percent during the two years before Daubert to 70
percent between mid-1995 and mid-1996"-though the rate sub-
sided after that.
121. 526 U.S.137 (1999).
122. See id. at 147-49, 153.
123. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
124. FED. R. EvID. 702.
125. Id. advisory committee's note.
126. See id.
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A tangible result of this increasing scrutiny of expert evidence
appears to have been an increase in both summary judgment mo-
tions and their success rate. "[S]ummary judgments were granted
in 21 percent of challenges during the four years preceding
Daubert, compared to 48 percent between July 1995 and June
1997." Noting that the success rate of Daubert challenges declined
after 1997, the authors speculate that litigants "either did not pro-
pose ... [expert] evidence not meeting the new standards, or bet-
ter tailored the evidence they did propose to fit the new
standards."
The Rand study's most surprising discovery is how little
Daubert seems to have changed the significance of Fye's old "gen-
eral acceptance" test. Before Daubert a judge's finding that an ex-
pert's methods were generally accepted always or almost always
assured a judgment that the evidence was reliable. After Daubert a
favorable finding on general acceptance secured such a judgment
ninety percent of the time. Conversely, an unfavorable finding on
general acceptance resulted in a finding of unreliability in an over-
whelming majority of cases before Daubert-and if anything made
exclusion of the evidence even more certain afterward. 127
D. Daubert and California
In People v. Leahy,128 the California Supreme Court declined to
adopt Daubert as the standard to be used to determine the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony in California. 129 Instead, the court chose to
adhere to its decision in Kelly adopting a general acceptance test.13 0
Although the court conceded that the Evidence Code sections gov-
erning expert testimony do not expressly sanction the use of the gen-
eral acceptance test, the court found the test compatible with those
provisions.13 1 More importantly, the court concluded that, despite its
weaknesses, Kelly was effective in excluding expert opinion based on
novel scientific principles or techniques not generally accepted by the
pertinent scientific community. 13 2
California's rejection of Daubert should not be overstated, how-
ever. Kelly is of limited application. California judges are required to
127. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 638 (2002) (citing LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES
IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE
Daubert Decision xvi, xvii, 44, 56 (2001) (alterations in original)) (internal citations omit-
ted); cf FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note ("A review of the case law after Daubert
shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.").
128. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
129. See id. at 330.
130. See id. at 328-31.
131. See id. at 327-28.
132. See id at 330-31. The court was also impressed by the Legislature's failure to abro-
gate the general acceptance test despite ample opportunity to so. See id. at 331.
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apply Kelly only when the admissibility of an expert's opinion is chal-
lenged on the ground that it is based on novel scientific principles or
techniques that lack the required acceptance by experts in the
field.' 33 Still, a California judge's screening role can differ sharply
from a federal judge's when Kelly does apply. While Daubert forces fed-
eral judges to determine the scientific validity of all expert testimony
grounded in science, Kelly merely requires California judges to deter-
mine whether the contested principle or technique has been accepted
as reliable by the relevant scientific community. The role of the Cali-
fornia judge is not to determine reliability as a scientific matter but
only whether the relevant scientific community has reached the pre-
scribed consensus. The head counting burden Kelly places on Califor-
nia judges is much less onerous than the burden Daubert imposes on
federal judges.
On the other hand, California judges do play a role similar to
that of federal judges when expert opinion is challenged on non-Kelly
grounds. Over objection the proponent must still persuade the judge
by preponderance of the evidence that (1) the expert's opinion is
based on the type of matter relied upon by experts in the field and (2)
the expert followed accepted protocols or methodologies in reaching
his or her opinion. 134 Opinions based on matter experts would ignore
or on incorrect procedures are unlikely to produce valid conclusions.
Accordingly, ruling on these objections requires California judges to
assess the scientific validity of the proffered opinion.
Does Kelly really matter? It is impossible to determine whether
California trial judges are called upon to decide Kelly challenges more
often than other challenges to the introduction of expert testimony.
Trial courts are not required to keep these data. Moreover, appellate
opinions disposing of expert testimony claims may not be representa-
tive. Still, appellate decisions do shed some light on the kinds of chal-
lenges California trial judges have to resolve. In the last twenty or so
years, of about thirty cases presenting expert questions on appeal, fif-
teen raised Kelly issues. 135 This figure suggests that in a substantial
number of cases, Kelly relieves California trial judges of the burden of
determining the scientific validity of the principle or technique un-
derlying the expert opinion.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
135. See MtNDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.04, at 422-27. Of the thirty or so cases raising ex-
pert questions, see id. § 16.04 nn. 35-89, fifteen raised Kelly issues, see id. § 16.04 nn. 71-86
plus People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
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VI. Suggested Changes
Daubert's re-examination of the role of judges in screening ex-
pert evidence offers an opportunity to reconsider the role judges
should play. Should judges be empowered to withhold the expert's
opinion from the jury unless they are satisfied by a preponderance of
the evidence that the opinion satisfies the reasonable reliance, gen-
eral acceptance or other tests? Or should judges let the jury evaluate
the worth of the opinion once they find that the proponent's evidence
satisfies the applicable test by a sufficiency standard? Under the latter
standard, judges would let the jury hear the expert testimony ifjudges
conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the opinion satisfies
the pertinent test if the proponent's evidence is believed. Although a
reconsideration of the judge's screening role raises important funda-
mental questions about the proper allocation of power between judge
and jury, the history of the rules of evidence as enacted and inter-
preted suggests a continuing commitment to retaining the present
balance. As some judges have stressed, jurors are not to. be trusted to
evaluate the validity of expert evidence, especially when the evidence
appears to judges to carry a "misleading aura of scientific
infallibility."' 13 6
Nonetheless, something can be learned from Daubert. Precisely
because Kelly is limited to assessing the admissibility of evidence based
on novel scientific principles or techniques, California trial judges, like
their federal counterparts, must determine the validity of other expert
testimony. In discharging this function, it would be more useful to
provide California judges and practitioners with the kind of checklist
provided by amended Rule 702 than the simple and somewhat incom-
plete principle of section 801 (b) of the California Evidence Code.
Limiting expert opinions to those based on matter "that is of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opin-
ion upon the subject to which his testimony relates"'137 does not em-
brace the universe of objections that could be raised. It would be
much more useful if section 801 (b) were rewritten to include chal-
lenges to the validity of the principles as well as the propriety of the
methods experts use in reaching their opinions.
The 1999 version of Uniform Rule of Evidence 702 includes these
grounds as well as challenges to the need for the expert testimony, the
qualifications of the witness to provide the evidence, and the propriety
136. Stol, 783 P.2d at 711.
137. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995).
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of the data used by the expert in his or her testimony. 138 Grouping the
most common objections in one section would help judges and law-
yers grasp quickly the standards for admitting expert testimony in
California.
The amended section or its comment should make clear that the
grounds listed are not exclusive. 139J Scientific and technical knowledge
is dynamic, and it would be unwise to attempt to include all possible
substantive objections to expert evidence in a single rule. 140 Moreo-
ver, to dispel confusion about the burden the proponent must dis-
charge, the comment should be rewritten to clarify that objections
based on the use of inappropriate matter, invalid principles, or incor-
rect methods should be determined under section 405.141
The limited applicability of Kelly also needs to be reconsidered.
Despite its flaws, its saving virtue is that it precludes saddling judges-
many of whom have no scientific training-with the difficult burden
of determining the scientific validity of opinions in those instances
where the opponent merely claims rejection by the pertinent scientific
community of the principle or technique underlying the opinion.
Head counting might be a better way of excluding unreliable expert
evidence contested on this ground than an individual judge's determi-
nation of the scientific validity of the principle or technique involved.
But there appears to be no convincing reason for limiting Kelly to
those cases in which the principle or technique is "novel." While Kelly
might be especially useful in those cases, any expert opinion predi-
cated on principles or techniques rejected by experts in the field
should likewise be excluded. The Rules, as amended, and the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence do not limit the general acceptance test to
novel scientific principles or techniques. 42 The comment to an
amended section 801 (b) should make this clear.
138. See UNIF. R. EVID. 702.
139. For an example of how this can be accomplished, see UNIF. R. EVID. 702(e) ("In
determining the reliability of a principle or method, the court shall consider all relevant
additional factors, which may include: .... ").
140. As the California Law Revision Commission observed:
It is not practical to formulate a detailed statutory rule that lists all of the matters
upon which an expert may properly base his opinion, for it would be necessary to
prescribe specific rules applicable to each field of expertise. This is clearly impos-
sible; the subjects upon which expert opinion may be received are too numerous
to make statutory prescriptions of applicable rules a feasible venture.
CAL. EvIo. CODE § 801 law revision commission's cmt. (West 1995).
141. The comment to section 405 already provides that this section governs whether an
expert is qualified to testify. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly judiciary committee's cmt.
(West 1995).
142. See FED. R. EvID. 702; UNIF. R. EVID. 702.
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VII. Cross Examining Experts
The Code has a number of provisions regulating the cross-exami-
nation of expert witnesses. A general provision allows the adverse
party to cross examine an expert to the same extent as any other wit-
ness, including the expert's qualifications, the subject to which the
expert's testimony relates, the matter upon which the expert's opin-
ion is based, and the reasons for the expert's opinion."43 Another al-
lows the adverse party to question an expert about the compensation
and expenses paid the expert by the calling party. 144 The Rules do not
have specific provisions on these matters, but all are within the federal
definition of relevant matter, since evidence relating to the credibility
of witnesses is "of consequence to the determination of the action."'1 45
The Code, but not the Rules, prohibits cross examining an expert
in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific, technical, or
professional text, treatise, journal, or similar publication unless:
(1) The witness referred to, considered, or relied upon such
publication in arriving at or forming his or her opinion.
(2) The publication has been admitted in evidence.
(3) The publication has been established as a reliable author-
ity by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice.146
The Law Revision Commission justifies limitation (1) on the fol-
lowing grounds:
If an expert witness has relied on a particular publication in form-
ing his opinion, it is necessary to permit cross-examination in re-
gard to that publication in order to show whether the expert
correctly read, interpreted, and applied the portions he relied on.
Similarly, it is important to permit an expert witness to be cross-
examined concerning those publications referred to or considered
by him even though not specifically relied on by him in forming his
opinion. An expert's reasons for not relying on particular publica-
tions that were referred to or considered by him while forming his
opinion may reveal important information bearing upon the credi-
bility of his testimony. However, a rule permitting cross-examina-
tion on technical treatises not considered by the expert witness
would permit the cross-examiner to utilize this opportunity not for
its ostensible purpose-to test the expert's opinion-but to bring
before the trier of fact the opinion of absentee authors without the
safeguard of cross-examination .... [T]he statements in the text
might be based on inadequate background research, might be sub-ject to unexpressed qualifications that would be applicable to the
143. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 (a) (West Supp. 2002).
144. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 722(b) (West 1995).
145. FED. R. EvID. 401; see also FED. R. EVID. 402.
146. CAL. EVD. CODE § 721(b) (West 1995).
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case before the court, or might be unreliable for some other rea-
son that could be revealed if the author were subject to cross-
examination. 
14 7
Despite these admonitions, the California Supreme Court has ig-
nored the Code's prohibition on crossing experts on treatises they did
not consider. According to the court, "[A] party seeking to attack the
credibility of [an] expert may bring to the attention of the jury mate-
rial relevant to the issue on which the expert has offered an opinion
[and] of which the expert was unaware or which he did
notconsider." 148
Though the material may be called to the expert's attention on
cross-examination, upon request the jury must be told not to consider
the material for the truth of the matter asserted unless it has been
received in evidence or qualifies under a hearsay exception such as
the one for learned treatises.' 4 9 Thus, while a mental health expert
may be asked whether he is aware that a particular researcher has
found that "psychiatrists are unable to accurately diagnose schizophre-
147. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 law revision commission's cmt. (West 1995).
148. People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 145 (Cal. 1989) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 963 (1990).
In criminal cases, the Right-to-Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8, the Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights initiative (adoptedJune 8, 1982), if literally construed, would repeal the
Code limitation on crossing experts. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). Evidence that an ex-
pert is unaware of important works in his field of expertise is relevant to the expert's lack
of credibility. But Bell did not rely on Proposition 8 to defend the departure from the
Code. See Bell, 778 P. 2d at 145. For an extended discussion of the effects of Proposition 8
on evidence attacking or supporting the credibility of witnesses, see MPNDEZ, supra note 2,
§ 15.03, at 346.
Perhaps what the Bell court had in mind is the distinction between identity and sub-
stance. It is one matter to ask an expert on cross to identify the publications the expert did
not consider or rely on; it is quite another to use the expert to get the substance of those
publications before the fact finder.
149. See MENDEZ, supra note 2, § 16.06, at 435. As a practical matter, such cross-exami-
nation is not fruitful unless the expert concedes that the author of the material is an expert
in the area in which the testifying expert offered an opinion. If the testifying expert refuses
to concede the author's expertise, the cross-examiner will have to establish it through some
other source.
The hearsay problem will disappear if the testifying expert adopts the assertions in the
material as his or her own. This can be done by asking the testifying expert if he or she
agrees with the assertions in the material. If the expert declines to adopt the assertions,
then the cross examiner will have to rely on a hearsay exception. For a discussion of the
learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule, see MtNOEZ, supra note 2, § 12.01, at
287-88.
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nia and paranoia,"'15 the jurors should be warned not to consider the
researcher's finding for the truth of the matter asserted.' 5 '
The limits on the cross examiner are inapplicable if the publica-
tion has been received into evidence. 152 No risk then exists that inad-
missible evidence will be brought before the jury.153 The problem is
getting such publications into evidence. Judicial notice is unlikely to
help since statements in technical treatises are hardly the kind of "uni-
versally known" facts and propositions within the grasp of persons of
average intelligence. 154 The California hearsay exception for learned
treatises is likewise unavailing; it provides an exception only for "facts
of general notoriety and interest,"'155 that is, facts and propositions
that are not subject to dispute. 156
The Federal Rules are more generous than the Code with respect
to the cross-examination of experts. First, they permit the cross exam-
iner to inquire about statements in treatises, irrespective of whether
the expert relied on them or considers them authoritative. 157 The
Rules are designed to avoid "the possibility that the expert may at the
outset block cross-examination by refusing to concede reliance or au-
thoritativeness." 15s Second, the Rules provide that the statements may
be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted if (1) the statements
are established as reliable authority by expert testimony orjudicial no-
tice and (2) the treatise was relied upon by an expert witness on direct
examination or was called to the expert's attention on cross-examina-
tion. 159 Thus, when a treatise has been established as authoritative,
appropriate passages may be read in evidence, so long as an expert is
on the stand and available to explain and assist in applying the
treatise. 60
Cross examining experts fully and admitting statements in
learned treatises under circumstances that assist the fact finder in eval-
150. People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 435 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893 (1992),
and reh'g denied, 506 U.S. 1016 (1992).
151. See id.
152. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b) (2) and law revision commission's cmt. (West 1995 &
Supp. 2002).
153. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 law revision commission's cmt. (West Supp. 2002).
154. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 451 (f) and assembly judiciary committee's cmt. (West
1995).
155. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341 (West 1995).
156. See MtNDEZ, supra note 2, § 12.01, at 287.
157. See FED. R. EviD. 803(18) advisory committee's note.
158. Id.
159. See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
160. See id. and advisory committee's note.
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uating their reliability would help promote the truth-finding function
of trials. Consideration, therefore, should be given to adopting the
federal approach to examining experts and the federal definition of
the hearsay exception for statements in learned treatises and similar
publications.
VIII. Court Appointed Experts
Both the Code and the Rules allow judges to appoint experts on
their own or a party's motion if in the judge's discretion expert assis-
tance is necessary. 161 The Code authorizes judges to appoint experts
to investigate and report as well as to testify. 162 The Rules are not as
specific; they simply require the judge to inform the experts of their
duties. 163 Experts appointed by federal judges, however, are required
to inform the parties of their findings, if any. 164 The Code is silent on
this point, but nothing in the Code precludes a California judge from
ordering court appointed experts to disclose their findings to the
parties.
The Rules expressly allow the parties to depose a court appointed
expert.165 The Code does not contain an equivalent provision.' 66
The Code and the Rules empower the judge to fix the compensa-
tion to be paid to court appointed experts and, in civil actions, to
apportion the compensation among the parties.167 In California crimi-
pal and juvenile cases and in federal criminal and unjust compensa-
tion cases, special provisions are made for compensating experts.' 68
In federal court, each party may cross-examine a court appointed
expert, including the party calling the expert.' 69 In California, each
party may cross-examine the expert if the court calls and examines the
expert.170 But if a party calls the court appointed expert, the calling
party may not examine the expert as if on cross-examination.'
7
'
161. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 1995).
162. See Cal. Evid. Code § 730.
163. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Deposing experts is governed generally by CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West
1998).
167. See FED. R. EVID. 706(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 731(c) (Westl995).
168. See FED. R. EVID. 706(b); CAL. EVID. Code § 731(a). The Code also has special
provisions for compensating medical experts appointed by the court. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 731 (b).
169. See FED. R. EVD. 706(a).
170. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 732 (West 1995).
171. See id.
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Both the Code and the Rules allow the judge to inform the jurors
of the fact that an expert witness was appointed by the court. 172 In
both jurisdictions, the calling of court appointed experts does not pre-
clude the parties from calling their own experts to testify on the same
matters. 173 No changes appear to be needed in the Code.
172. See FED. R. EVID. 706(c); CAL. EVID. CODE§ 722 (West 1995).
173. See FED. R. EVID. 706(d); CAL. EVID. CODE § 733 (West 1995).
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